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PARTI 
A REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTOR 
AND TRADE UNION POSITIONS ON PRICE 
CONTROL 
V 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
This paper has been written as a response to a workshop on price control and consumer 
protection held at the Park Lane Hotel from 9th to 11th September, 1987. Several 
papers were presented at this workshop which was jointly organised by the ZCTU and 
the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe. 
The present paper therefore provides a synthesis of the insight of the position papers 
presented by the following parties with regard to price control and consumer protection: 
• Government - Ministry of Trade and Commerce 
• ZNCC - Private sector (CZI and EMCOZ were not represented). 
• ZCTU - Employees' umbrella organisation. 
While this paper provides a synthesis of the position papers presented at the workshop, 
it also gives an analysis of the three positions taken by the abovementioned parties and 
concludes by providing "our perspective" on price control and possible short as well as 
long-term solutions. Of all the consumer protection mechanisms, only price control will 
be dealt with in this paper. This stems from the central position of price control in the 
debate on the policy of Growth with Equity, i.e. planned economic growth and 
distribution of the national cake. It also follows that consumer protection from 
exploitation is conditioned by the degree of effectiveness of price control. 
The ZNCC Perspective of Price Control 
The ZNCC's definition of price control is that "price control is Government intervention 
to regulate price levels of selected produces and services as part of the macro-policy 
control".1 TTie three outlined methods of price control are: 
• Specific price 
• Specific mark-up 
• Ministerial approval. 
They view the motive behind price control as that of complementing other economic 
policies to achieve overall objectives, e.g: 
• Employment creation 
• Inflation control 
• Redistribution of resources 
• Management of shortages 
• Economic growth. 
1 Mandevhani, K., "Price Control in Zimbabwe: A ZNCC Perspective", Page 1, 
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In spite of the realisation of the positive move made by Government for the benefit of 
the entire economy, the position of the ZNCC was that as an organisation they are 
agreeable to price control inasfar as it is one of the many policy controls Government 
relies upon in achieving its intended economic objectives. But the need to ensure that 
no "side effects" occur was expressed. It was emphasised in the stylish business 
diplomacy that if these were ignored business viability would suffer and so will 
consumers and workers and ultimately the Government. 
The justification for the adoption of this position by the ZNCC is that: 
• Price control suppresses and does not control inflation, giving an example that 
producers can reduce the quality of products to maintain their profit margins. It is 
also pointed out that this situation would lead to inflation when demand outstrips 
supply on account of artificially low prices; 
• It reduces business profit margins, thus inhibiting: 
- Investment 
- Employment creation 
- Product extensions 
- International competitiveness. 
• It is a burden to the fiscus as price monitoring inspectors have to be employed; 
• There are bureaucratic delays as it can take time for price increase applications to 
be processed; 
• It may not achieve its intended objectives, moreso when no supportive sound policies 
exist; 
• It leads to quality reduction to maintain profit margins. 
As an overall solution to the question of controlling inflation the ZNCC provided 
short-term and long-term recommendations. These were drawn up with the conviction 
that the existing price control system had failed, adding that the two price freezes of 1981 
and 1987 were enough testimony. 
As a short-term measure, the ZNCC says the Government should control intermediate 
goods/raw materials and de-control the rest, i.e. let market forces control the final price 
of the commodities. And as a long-term solution, the Government should de-control 
intermediate goods and raw materials, and control should be exercised in the form of 
fiscus/monetary policy, e.g. taxing expenditure income and subsidising the recipients. 
Analysis of the ZNCC's Position 
To make a logical analysis of the ZNCC's position it is essential to understand that price 
control is one among some of the measures adopted by the Government to suppress the 
rising rate of inflation and to relatively protect the poor. 
While the argument put forward by the ZNCC against price control is to a limited extent 
valid (that is, price control suppresses and does not control inflation), the supportive 
itinerary is not convincing enough to warrant the dismantling of the existing price control 
system. To support their argument, it is assumed that in order to maintain their profit 
margins the capitalists reduce the quality of products and following that, the prices would 
be kept artificially low. This is further supported by the assumption that in this situation 
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demand would outstrip supply. The assumptions only amount to bourgeois economic 
reasoning, for they mean nothing more than the drive for profit maxLnisation, which is 
the motive force behind capitalist production. 
The recommendation that Government should control intermediate goods/raw 
materials and de-control the rest and that the final prices of goods should be left to the 
free market forces of demand and supply cannot by any means be a solution to the high 
rate of inflation that the economy is experiencing. In other words, the above 
recommendation would lead to an increase in the inflation rate with prices continuously 
increasing and the real wages decreasing. That is, the double-edged short-term 
recommendations by the ZNCC will only benefit the capitalist community while 
negatively affecting the toiling masses. 
The implication of this move would be that the producers/ manufacturers would get raw 
materials/intermediate goods at cheap controlled prices. This would obviously 
contribute to the reduction of the ultimate production cost of the goods. What would 
be most questionable and of national concern is whether the manufacturers and 
producers would charge prices affordable by the community in view of the ZNCC 
craving for increasing profit margins. 
Obviously, many a bourgeois scholar would quickly point out to the fact that competition 
would force the prices down to affordable levels. But competition always overlooks the 
mechanics which maintain the "desired" balance between supply and demand within the 
parameters provided for by the anarchy of the capitalist economy. That is, this anarchical 
nature of competition under capitalist conditions renders a temporary character to the 
regulatory role of competition. The effects from whichever trend the competition would 
direct the market, that is, demand outstripping supply on one hand or vice versa, would 
permanently affect both the economic growth and the living standards of the masses of 
the people. 
The recommendation that the Government should control inflation through the fiscus, 
i.e. taxing expenditure income and subsidising the recipients, falls short of serious 
consideration of the economic welfare of the community. What this recommendation 
simply means is that the burden of price increase is shifted to the consumer through 
taxation. Thus an increase in taxation on expenditure would mean an increase in the 
prices of the commodity to the consumer. A further increase in taxation on personal 
income would be followed by reduction in the purchasing power of the community. 
The consumers would have to struggle against: 
• Continued price increases that would have been left to the free market forces of 
demand and supply; 
• Increased taxation which would lead to a further erosion of their purchasing power 
and/or diminishing of their real income. 
Government Position on Price Control 
The Government's position paper on price control highlighted that it controls prices to 
protect the poorer section of the population. Government believes that if prices are left 
to the free market forces of demand and supply the majority of the population would 
find many commodities beyond their reach. ^The paper cited five methods of price 
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control. These mechanisms used by Government are as follows: 
• Prices of certain basic commodities are fixed. That is, the final fixed prices take into 
account the costs of producing the commodities at "reasonable profit margins" to 
producers/manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. 
• Minimum producer prices are fixed to protect agricultural producers against falling 
income due to bumper harvests. 
• Application of certain stipulated percentage mark-ups or profit margins on the 
landed cost to the manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers before arriving at their 
selling prices. 
• Prices of some goods may not be increased at the factory/wholesale level without 
prior or written approval of the Minister of Trade and Commerce, and; 
• Approval of the cost calculation formula used by the manufacturers, wholesalers 
and retailers by the Minister of Trade and Commerce. 
The following categories of goods are not subject to price control: 
• Goods for export 
• Goods sold by public auction 
• Second-hand goods, other than used cars 
• Food and drinks other than traditional and clear beer sold for consumption on the 
premises 
• Eggs in the shell, fresh flowers, vegetables and fruits. 
The order SI 743 of 1980 requires the retailers to display their prices to make it absolutely 
clear what the prices of their commodities are; and what additional sum will be added 
for hire purchase facilities. This is reinforced by price control inspectors and in some 
cases members of the Police Commercial Crime Unit carry out price control duties. In 
spite of the above methods to effect price control and coupled with them, the supportive 
staff; the effective implementation of the price control mechanism is still inhibited by 
several problems. These were identified as follows: 
• Some traders lack the capability of carrying out costing exercises in order to 
determine their selling prices. In certain cases this has led to overcharging. 
• Consumers are sometimes ignorant of their rights and hence do not report any cases 
of unfair treatment, e.g. overcharging, to the relevant authorities. 
• There are few price monitoring inspectors due to financial constraints. 
• Transport cost-determination for rural traders. 
Analysis of Government's Position on Price Control 
Jt is felt that the Government made a positive move in controlling prices, *«neciall£those 
for basic_cominodities to enable prices to be kept "stable" and "affordableM)y the 
community. However, the mechanism of price^ontroTadopted has nofaddressed itself 
to the root causes of price fluctuations in the economy. Thus, if the Government could 
• 
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control prices for raw materials/intermediate goods as well as the final prices of 
commodities, prices would be kept low and within the reach of the majority of the 
community. Much as the problem is related to the final price, its greatest weight is 
associated with the cost of production as will be explained in Part Two: "Price Control 
and Consumer Protection: Our Perspective". 
The role played by the Government in price determination is very minimal. In essence, 
the producers/manufacturers set the pace in price determination by calculating the costs 
of production, with the Government coming in to apply "reasonable" margins of profit 
or a "certain stipulated percentage mark-up on the landed costs", or/and approval of 
prices which have already been determined. 
With the marginal role of the Government in price formation, what might be termed 
"illogical processes" in an economic context have emerged. This is apparent from the 
words of the Governor of the Reserve Bank who says: 
Local companies have been exporting at less than material cost, even at less than the cost of 
imported material content, something which is very hard to justify because if that company can 
maintain that type of export performance over a two or three-year period, one may ask how they 
can finance this... Companies who sign long-term agreements at less than material cost make one 
really wonder if they are still exporting or whether they are transferring resources...2 
It would also be of particular interest to determine whether the Government in 
considerating price-controlled goods takes into account the income of the community. 
What yardstick is used to classify a commodity as a basic commodity to avoid a situation 
where low-income consumers end up being restricted to certain types of goods? This 
situation would arise simply because some goods are not affordable because they are 
not price controlled. 
It is from the above that the class character of the current price control system is 
apparent. That is, the minimal involvement of the Government in the process of price 
formation provides the capitalist economic bloc with enough discretionary powers to tilt 
the balance to accord with the interest of the bourgeois and the petty bourgeois class. 
ZCTU's Perspective on Price Control 
The ZCTU made a fairly critical analysis of Government policy and price control which 
is defined in the function of the Prices Board and Price Control Committee. These are 
listed as follows: 
• Advising the Minister of Trade and Commerce on matters relating to the price 
control system. 
• Checking on any profiteering elements in prices or exploitation of the public while 
at the same time ensuring that firms remain profitable and viable; and 
• Checking that essential basic commodities are available to the masses of the people 
at reasonable prices. 
2 Abstracted from Halimana, M.C..: Industrialisation in the Context of Liberalisation: Issues for 
Zimbabwe in the Coming Decade. 
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The workers' umbrella organisation query the second and third functions of the Prices 
Board and Price Control Committee. Their contradiction under capitalist conditions 
tends to be antagonistic, forcing the Government to provide (in the early stages of the 
implementation of the Act) consumer subsidies. It was also pointed out that, yielding 
to pressures, the Government of late had tended to increase producer subsidies while 
deliberately reducing consumer subsidies (see ZCTU paper in Appendix II). The 
reduction of consumer subsidies has created a sad scenario as regards the precarious 
balance between the provision of basic commodities at affordable prices and at the same 
time maintaining profitability. It therefore seems that the solution to this contradiction 
has been found in the piling of misery on the shoulders of the already suffering masses. 
The ZCTU argues that inflation has eroded the purchasing power of workers as prices 
have shot up while real wages have decreased. Thus, the organisation advocates for the 
restoration of the value of labour power which has persistently been estranged from the 
masses of the workers. The worker organisation further advocates for effective 
implementation of price controls and a general widening of the controls to include all 
items in the PDL. 
The ZCTU's recommendations are contained in the paper "Price Control in Zimbabwe: 
A ZCTU Perspective" (see Appendix II). 
Analysis of the ZCTU Position 
The ZCTU paper takes a positive direction in that it analyses price control as a 
Government policy which should not be taken in isolation without consideration of how 
the workers are estranged from the produce of their labour. It has been pointed out that 
this leads to the general degeneration of the value of labour power. The argument put 
forward by the ZCTU that an analysis of Government's ability to influence prices to the 
extent that basic commodities are affordable by the majority of the people on the one 
hand and maintaining profitability of producers on the other hand is contradictory, and 
thus needs a more in-depth examination. 
To be content with the more general conceptualisation of economic terminologies 
results in trivialising the categories of "affordibility" and "profitability" in capitalist 
conditions. That is, the solution to their contradiction lies with the control of and the 
direct participation of the Government in the whole process of price formation 
especially its conscious involvement in the determination of cost of production, a task 
which is impossible if the ownership remains private. The functions of the prices and 
their relation with the subsidies, both to production and consumption, should be 
explored in this regard. This would create a situation whereby the relationship between 
these two categories becomes compatible in a complementary form rather than the 
reconciliatory approach currently being used. This is only to deceive those who are not 
involved in the use of quantitative methods and exploit the efficiency of computer 
technology. The answers are obvious as profitability will remain the priority area over 
affordibility. Obviously, it would take a long time for a worker to feel the effects of this 
relationship on his personal budget and trace its origin. 
The argument that the withdrawal of consumer subsidies has led to lack of financial 
cushioning of the lowly paid, the peasants and other sectors of the lower strata features 
as an important starting point in the whole debate on subsidies, their source and 
direction. The statistical/quantitative information reveals that currently the purchasing 
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power of the consumers has been eroded as prices have continued to rise and subsidies 
to consumers have been withdrawn (see ZCTU paper, Appendix II). 
The ZCTU in^their search for the restoration of the lost values in the life of the working 
people were justified to recommend as a short-term measure that the Government has 
to consider the Riddell Commission recommendations (1981). The commission 
recommended that wages should be adjusted to the PDL level over a period of time, 
and then be adjusted in money terms as the prices of the components of the PDL change. 
Some Factors Hampering the ZCTU's Effectiveness in the Tripartite Structures 
Zanu-PF as the ruling party is committed to scientific socialism based on the Marxist-Leninist 
principles and is solemnly and irrevocably committed to the establishment of a socialist society. 
Zanu-PF is ardently convinced that the workers should play a leading role in the struggle for the 
establishment of a new socio-economic order. 
The Labour Relations Act 1985 was intended to democratise labour relations and foster 
worker unity in clear recognition of the historic role of the working class in socialist 
revolution. The then Minister of Labour, Cde Frederick Shava, in relation to the Act, 
said: 
In drafting the Bill, the Government was guided by the need to give workers their rightful and 
historic role in the Society and the economy...The Bill does in essence... clearly recognise the 
critical importance of the workers...the producers of wealth...a role denied by the previous and 
successive colonial regimes in Zimbabwe. 
The Act provides a bold pronouncement of the fundamental rights of workers which are 
set out in the main as: 
• Entitlement to membership of Trade Unions 
• Entitlement to membership of Workers' Committees 
• Fair labour standards 
• Democracy in the workplace 
• Protection against various forms of discrimination. 
In the preamble to the Act, State paternalism is indicated to protect the workers. The 
question becomes whether or not the Act does, in fact, realise the objective as stipulated 
by ZANU-PF and as supported by Cde Shava in the quotation made earlier on, given 
State paternalism towards workers (Trade Unions) as stipulated in the Act. 
Strikes as a form of workers' struggle for economic emancipation are viewed by many 
as an essential tool to safeguard workers' interests. The provisions of the Act as regards 
the right to strike are so complex and so subject to the Ministry powers that it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that under SI 18 of the Act workers do not have the power to 
strike. It is known that in any economy the law is determined by economic relations. 
Those who are economically stronger are the ones who determine to a large extent the 
nature and character of the law. The Labour Relations Act is operating in a capitalist 
society and therefore the rights that it gives to workers are only those that the capitalists 
are in a position to exploit to their own benefit. However, contradictions in the economy 
are approaching unprecedented levels, as the political independence alone is being 
completely undermined by the capitalist economic power. There was a need to explain 
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what political independence without economic power means in a capitalist society, 
rather than "protect" the workers from capitalist exploitation. The effects are quite 
apparent now. 
As the growth of the economy gradually shrinks (and the bourgeoisie at the centre of 
the trend) the workers' position is in the same degree gradually eroded. The degree of 
erosion which is felt most at the household level has been depicted quantitatively at 
national level by unemployment statistics. While inflation has its toll on the lives of the 
workers, the redistribution of the "family cake" at the household level generates much 
heat in the debate on the workers' struggle for a new socio-economic order. 
The redistribution of the household income between workers and their unemployed 
family members (immediate and extended family) which is by virtue of its "nature" a 
social procedure, further weakens the workers' initiative and working morale. The 
increase of pressure on the workers in the final analysis ends up in the collective act by 
workers confined at first in those areas of work where the pressure is felt most. This 
process whose objectivity lies in the proper economic conditions prevalent in a given 
historical perspective can develop and affect the entire economy. In this case the Act 
as an instrument of law would provide an avenue to direct confrontation between the 
patron and the client. 
This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the paternalistic relation between the 
Government and trade unions (ZCTU) has demobilised the latter's power to engage in 
constructive criticism of the former. This paternalistic relationship is reflected in the 
Act as has already been discussed. 
The private sector, on the other hand, still holds the "Does" or "Don't" grip on the 
economy. This automatically makes them more influential on the bargaining platform 
as compared to Trade Unions. Obviously, this situation forces the ZCTU to blindly 
follow in the tracks of the Government resulting in the weakening of their bargaining 
power and the neutralisation of their basis for constructive criticism. While the Act gives 
a theoretical recognition of workers' rights it facilitates the practical realisation of 
employers' interests. While at first impression the Act seems to give provisions to 
advance the interest of workers this cannot happen as long as the capitalist nature of the 
economy still exists. It follows that the existence of the capitalist economy is conditioned 
by the bold fact that the Government has an interest in the "efficient production and 
smooth running of the economy". This militates against any effort to promote the rights 
of workers if productivity is likely to suffer. 
The relationship outlined above between the State and the Trade Unions has gone so 
far as to sacrifice the economic growth and social well-being of the working people. 
There is no doubt then that the high cost of planning in relation to its benefits, which 
are attributed to the large number of uncertainities and uncontrollable factors, is due in 
part to this elder and child relationship, before a strong and charging private sector and 
to the central uncertainty of whether an organisation will follow its own rules. To clearly 
and separately define the operational areas of the Government and the ZCTU in this 
perspective is to cut the cost of planning to a degree sufficient to justify continued 
planning. 
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This central method of economic management is currently an elite speciality explicitly 
pursued in the interests of the masses. Thus it can be concluded that the effect of 
planning by inaccessible elites is a denial of human rights and a limitation on human 
potential. To eliminate these effects of elitism, it is necessary to enforce mechanisms 
which allow for a widespread participation in the planning process. The purpose of such 
participation is to guarantee the self-interest of those for whom the planning is pursued 
(i.e. the masses), that is, development goals must be formulated in consultation with 
those whose co-operation is most essential in achieving the goals. 
The ZCTU, therefore, should make a break from the comfort provided for by the 
paternalistic relations with the Government and play its role as a workers' organisation. 
Methods which press for workers' participation in the operations of their respective 
enterprises should be looked into seriously. The workers should be conversant with the 
realities surrounding them, i.e. the production process. 
This is more powerful and qualitatively superior a weapon, with much relevance to the 
current socio-economic situation. The understanding by the workers of all different 
indicators involved in production, distribution, exchange and consumption would help 
them present a co-ordinated interpretation of the dynamics of productive and social life 
and be convinced then, and only then, that strikes as a form of economic struggle hinder 
production and thus economic growth. 
Effective participation in decision-making at enterprise, sector and national level by the 
workers enhances the development of their management skills and bargaining powers. 
What is hindering the ZCTU from comparatively effecting its role and hence its 
subordination to the Government is the lack of information on the functions, 
organisation, management and operations of the enterprise. 
Monopoly of company information is a major and quite often a decisively deadly weapon 
at the disposal of the employer. Workers don't have access to employers' exploitation 
mechanisms and wealth-amassing secrets. As long as workers do not have the 
knowledge and capacity to divulge or understand information pertaining to the 
enterprise, the whole collective bargaining machinery is reduced to a complete mockery 
and the two parties can never be said to be on equal footing, which is a pre-condition to 
genuine collective bargaining. 
Although the top-bottom, bottom-up structure was established in early 1980, little has 
been done to enforce the participation of workers in running the affairs of the economy. 
PART II 
PRICE CONTROL AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 
OUR PERSPECTIVE 
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Price Formation and Functions 
Cost of production as the base for the formation of price will be discussed in the 
forthcoming section. In this section a brief analysis of the price formation system and 
the functions of prices will be made. 
Prices are considered here as the monetary expression of the value of commodities. The 
degree of validity of this statement depends on the concrete socio-economic conditions 
in which the prices are formed, i.e. the pricing policies, the authenticity and reliability 
of the price formulation base. These objectives could be achieved by means of prices 
through their different functions. 
The functions of prices are: 
• Planning and calculation 
• Production/consumption 
• Stimulation; and 
• Distribution and redistribution. 
The diverse and productively variable character of labour can only be reflected by a 
common index of value. Thus, through the function of planning and calculation, the 
prices serve as an element of measure and calculation of all distinct economic indicators. 
That is, the prices serve more or less as a measuring instrument of the value of the units 
of production. This is conditioned by the fact that they should reflect the socially 
necessary labour cost in the production of goods and services. It then follows that the 
more ameliorate and precise the prices are the more they reflect how it cost the society 
to satisfy the social needs and hence the more reliable and plan-worthy the economic 
calculation base. Thus, the whole planning process and the projection of the economic 
activities and the co-ordination of the sectoral components would be based on more 
accurate and concrete information. 
The active role of prices in the development of the economy is mainly in stimulating 
production and consumption. The essence of this function of prices consists in 
stimulating or destimulating the production and consumption of different types of 
products, i.e. the prices in this case influence positively or negatively both production 
and consumption. 
Prices exercise their influence in production through the magnitude of profits. In other 
words, the prices should be "reasonable" to compensate the cost of production and to 
guarantee a defined margin of profit. Thus, the formation of prices should rest in a series 
of principles in correspondence with the economic elements which compose it, i.e. the 
production costs and the profit margin. And the cornerstone to resolving this issue 
consists in deciding the level of costs which should be taken as the base for calculating 
the prices. This can result in the conscious reduction of the cost margin of one product 
or range of products and adding to the cost of another, thereby reducing and increasing 
the prices of these products respectively. 
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By virtue of some technical, organisational, and management and other peculiarities 
encountered in a particular enterprise or sector, the real cost of a product could 
considerably increase owing to excessive productive resource expenditure. That is, if 
prices are established on this assumption then, unfortunately, the prices would increase. 
It is from the above economic fact that the process of price formation should be 
substantiated on the planned production costs, calculated over and above the base of 
properly argued expenditure rates. Thus, average sectoral expenditure rates should be 
used. 
In the last instance, it should then correspond with the Ministry of Trade and Commerce 
or any central organisation (vested with the task of price formation and monitoring) to 
influence the direction of production through the stimulating and destimulating action 
of prices. This is pursued through the differentiation of the levels of profits in the prices 
of different types of products. With respect to consumption, the influence of prices takes 
place principally through the correlation levels of the prices of those products which are 
mutually substitutable. The Ministry should then orient the consumption towards those 
products which it would like to see produced. Thus, with this, they stimulate or 
destimulate the use of one type of product or a complete range of products. 
The distribution and redistribution of the national income is one of the functions of 
prices. It is supposed, firstly, that the national income is formed initially as an income 
for the workers in the form of salaries and as profits for different enterprises, i.e. State 
(public consumption); private sector (bourgeoisie consumption) and accumulation. 
Thus if the prices of products coincide with the value of the products then the magnitude 
of the national income produced and realised should coincide and in this case there is 
no redistribution of the national income between the sectors. Only distribution as a 
function of prices takes place, i.e. the products produced in one sector remain in that 
sector regardless of the form this takes (physical or value). 
Redistribution of national income exists and is manifest when the prices are diverted 
from the value of one product or the other. This is typical in the case where some sectors 
trade their products for a value superior to the produced value and other sectors selling 
at a value less than the value produced. This usually occurs also as a result of the 
stimulation policy adopted and towards which products. That is, the former sector 
appropriates part of the profits produced in the latter sector through the 
action/movement of prices and therefore redistribution of the national income within 
the economy exists, i.e. from one sector to the other. 
This is tantamount to a conscious manipulation of prices with the aim of raising the 
standards of living of the workers and stimulate those areas or sectors of production 
which are of ranked priority to the integral development of the economy. It might seem 
that there is a relative contradiction between the functions of prices, i.e. that of planning 
and calculation and the latter two, given that these take place within the same time 
framework. But, although this might be so, planning and calculation as a function of 
prices remain the determining factor in the whole process of price formation and their 
subsequent manipulation. 
Short-Term Solutions 
The Government has since independence adopted measures to contiol the rising rate 
of inflation, some of which are: 
• monetary and fiscal policies. 
• institution of the price control system. 
• income restraint policy since 1982. 
The relations of production for the Zimbabwean economy are capitalist. The product 
of labour is alienated from its producer and it has become elusive to obtain under the 
conditions of general degeneration of the value of labour power. The value of labour 
has continuously been decomposed. This paper seeks to come up with some of the 
methods the Government can use to recompose the value of labour power which to date 
has been overwhelmed by inflationary pressures. 
An indication of the erosion of purchasing power can be obtained by using the consumer 
price index as a yardstick to assess whether prices are rising in proportion to wages. It 
would give a rudimentary picture of the degree to which consumer prices have changed 
in a given period for the urban groups. The extent to which wage levels have risen in 
comparison with the consumer price index determined whether incomes have risen, 
fallen or remained constant. However, in using the CPI it is important to note that it 
has its own limitations and criticisms, e.g. the Zimbabwean CPI is compiled in light of 
data obtained from higher and lower income urban families. Rural families, which are 
supposedly the most vulnerable, are not included. 
This boils down to what Shopo and Moyo observed in 1986, thus: 
Rural labourers have, throughout the modern agricultural history of Zimbabwe, lived on the 
margin of subsistence, if not existence. The somewhat fallacious argument has been put forward by 
neo-classical economic historians that since agricultural labourers were paid a substantial part of 
their wage in customary kind forms, such as mealie-meal, salt and beans, they have not to that 
extent suffered real income declines in periods of recession or inflation.3 
Also in cases of slumps and booms the CPI would provide inappropriate comparison as 
a yardstick as the CPI would go by the economic situation prevailing at the time. 
Another shortcoming is that the range of items covered in the CPI is small. 
In spite of the above reservations on the use of the CPI as a yardstick it still remains as 
the only available instrument for assessing changes in the cost of living. If one makes a 
comparative analysis of the increase in the consumer price index and the minimum wage, 
one obviously concludes that the wage increases have been lost through an erosion of 
the purchasing power resulting in the continuous decomposition of the value of labour. 
To highlight the rate at which incomes are being eroded, Tables 1 and 2 show the impact 
of inflation on minimum wages in commerce and industry for the period 1980-1987. 
3 Shopo, T.D. and Moyo S., "Vulnerable Working Households in Zimbabwe's Segmented Labour 
Markets". Working Paper No. 5, Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies. 
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Table 1 
REAL WAGES AS FROM 1980 
Year CPI NW $ NWI RW $ RWI Varia-
tions 
1980 100,0 70 100,0 70,00 100,0 0,0 
1981 113,1 85 121,4 75,20 167,4 7,4 
1982 125,2 105 150,0 83,90 119,8 19,8 
1983 154,1 115 164,3 74,60 106,6 6,6 
1984 185,2 125 178,6 67,50 96,4 -3,6 
1985 200,9 143 204,3 71,20 101,7 1,7 
1986 229,7 158 227,7 65,50 98,3 -1,7 
1987 264,8 | 158 223,7 59,67 85,2 -14,8 
Key to abbreviations used in Table 1: 
CPI = Consumer Price Index 
NW— Nominal Wage 
NWI=Nominal Wage Index 
RW=Real Wage' 
RWI=Real Wage Index 
i 
Table 1 above shows that the consumer price index has constantly been increasing, but 
the real wage index is constantly decreasing. Whilst the nominal wage has been 
increasing, the real wage has been decreasing. 
The real wage reached its peak in 1982 and thereafter it has been declining. The obvious 
implication is that the little increases the workers obtained have been eroded through 
inflation. On the average, prices in 1987 were more than double the prices for 1980. 
Prices for 1987 went up by 164% as compared to prices for 1980. The high levels of 
prices for foodstuffs between 1983 and 1986 and inflation at 20% and 19,7% for June 
and July 1987 clearly show the pressure inflation bears on the lowly paid, more so when 
one considers that foodstuffs account for at least 55% of their income. 
Whilst the increase in the consumer price index has led to the erosion of the real wages 
as is shown in Table 1 it has also had adverse effects on the purchasing power of the 
dollar. Tables 2 and 3 below show the effects of the increase in prices on consumer 
purchasing power for higher and lower income urban families respectively. 
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Table 2 
PURCHASING POWER OF THE 198fl DOLLAR FOR HIGHER-INCOME URBAN FAMILIES 
Year CPI Purchasing Power for the Z$ 
1980 100,0 100,00 
1981 114,6 87,26 
1982 135,1 74,01 
1983 158,1 63,29 
1984 177,7 56,27 
1985 195,3 51,20 
1986 222,8 44,88 
1987 252,8 39,65 
Source: Computed from CSO data on CPI. 
Table 3 
PURCHASING POWER OF THE 1980 DOLLAR FOR LOWER-INCOME URBAN FAMILIES 
Year CPI Purchasing Power for the Z$ 
1980 100,0 100,00 
1981 113.0 88,49 
1982 125,2 79,87 
1983 154,1 64,89 
1984 185,2 53,99 
1985 200,9 49,77 
1986 229,7 43,53 
1987 264,8 37,77 
Source: Calculated from CSO data on CPI. 
The rate of increase in prices as compared to the rate of increase in wages shows that 
the CPI is increasing at a faster rate comparatively. Table 4 below shows the minimum 
wage increase as from 1980. 
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Table 4 
MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES: 1980-1987 
Year Domestic & 
Agricultural Workers 
Commerce & Industry 
1980 30 70 
1981 50 85 
1982 50 105 
1983 55 115 
1984 65 125 
1985 75 125 
1986 85 158 
1987 85 108 
Source: Minimum Wages Statutory Instruments (Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social 
Welfare). Various years. 
Thus real minimum wages have been on a downward trend. On a sectoral basis, for 
example, in the agricultural sector Loewenson (1986) in her study observed that while 
nominal earnings in the sector rose from Z$ 149,7 million to Z$1285 million, or by 90%, 
in 1984 the rising cost of living for the low-income groups implied that real wages had 
not increased since 1982 and that they have, in fact, shown a decline. One can conclude, 
therefore, that despite the apparent increase in nominal earnings in the sector (from a 
minimum wage of Z$30 a month in 1980 to Z$85 a month in 1987) when related to the 
cost of living these earnings, in fact, show a decline in real terms, hence the Z$ 10-15 rise 
per year does not match rises in productivity. Table 5 shows the overall real earnings 
and real wages in relation to production. 
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Table 5 
AGRICULTURE: EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS (1975-1984) 
Year Employment 
(000s) 
% of Earnings 
Total ($m) 
%of 
Total 
Output 
($m) 
Current + 
%of 
GDP 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1984* 
363,8 
356.1 
348.2 
341.4 
335.2 
327,0 
274.3 
263.5 
260,0 
34,6 93,4 
34,4 103,2 
34,4 112,2 
34,6 120,1 
34,0 137,8 
32.4 149,7 
26,2 252,0 
35.5 279,5 
25,0 
8,9 
8,9 
9,0 
9,0 
9,2 
7,9 
8,0 
362.7 
383,0 
393.4 
409.8 
410,0 
565.5 
808,7 
802.6 
19,1 
18,6 
19.0 
18,9 
16.1 
17,5 
14,4 
15,8 
Notes: 
+Excludes Communal and Resettlement Sector 
*Estimated 
Source: CSO; Calculated from Quarterly Digest of Statistics. 
As a short-term measure to the effectiveness of price control, it is recommended that 
the recommendations by the participants to the workshop, which are contained in 
Appendix I-III of this paper, be adopted for implementation. 
In addition to the recommendations we also endorse the ZCTU's recommendation that 
prices should not be determined in isolation from wages. Wages should be increased to 
the Poverty Datum Line, and the PDL should be adjusted to the Consumer Price Index 
now and again. 
In the case of the peasantry, agricultural commodity pricing is such that tobacco is the 
only principal crop whose price is not set by the Government. The producer prices for 
the other principal crops are determined by the Government. The maximum selling 
prices of most of these crop's products are also determined by the State. Controlling 
consumer prices for these products protects the incomes of the peasants as in most cases 
these products are basic commodities necessary for survival. However, a problem with 
regard to this protection arises as high agricultural producer prices tend to lead to high 
prices in the final products from the agricultural sector. The Government could, 
therefore, provide subsidies, to cushion consumers' incomes. However, problems are 
likely to be encountered in this case as the functions of prices have not been realised 
and therefore applied in the formation and stipulation of prices for the different 
products and for the benefit of different groups of people. 
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Lessons could be drawn from the Hungarian situation with regard to the relationship 
between price rises and subsidies: 
There will be a big increase in the prices of basic consumer goods in Hungary next year... In 1988 
the level of consumer goods prices will increase by 15 percent and food prices by an average of 10,7 
percent. Hungarians will have to increase spending on the average by up to US$11 per month. To 
guarantee the basic needs of all social strata the Hungarian government will also take measures to 
raise welfare payments, with subsidies from the central government increasing by 22 percent and 
local governments contributing US$10 million for welfare aid... Pensioners, the handicapped and 
large families will receive financial aid to compensate for price increases.4 
Taking into account that agricultural products constitute a greater proportion of the raw 
materials used in the manufacturing sector on the one hand and basic consumer products 
on the other, the stipulation of certain stimulating producer prices has a direct impact 
on both consumers and producers as stated above. Thus, if the prices are based on 
authentic and reliably calculated levels of costs then the degree in which the dependent 
sector and the consumer would be affected can genuinely be assessed. Then this could 
be offset through subsidies to both production and consumption. 
It follows, therefore, that the increase in producer price should be pursued after 
assessing the reaction of other economic indicators and the behaviour of the social 
barometer. Failure to engage in the systematic approach would lead to a sad scenario 
as the US recent case following a rise in the producer price for sugar farmers shows: 
Americans are paying more than twice the world price for sugar because of what growers call 
necessary government price supports....The arrangement has US consumers paying 18c or more 
per pound for sugar. The world price is about 8,5c. The higher price, propped up by the US 
government, is strongly defended by the nation's 10 000-plus sugar growers. They say Federal help 
is all that keeps them from being wiped out by unfair world competition. But critics say the system 
is a textbook example of "special interest" legislation that is costing consumers up to 3 billion US 
dollars a year or US$100 for the average of four".5 
The exposition presented above is reinforced by the fact that currently the Department 
of Social Welfare (under its Public Assistance Scheme) provides allowances to a limited 
number of people. The Public Assistance Scheme should be expanded to cover a wider 
spectrum of people and their allowances should be adjusted according to the cost of 
living. In the case of the unemployed, the National Social Security Bill that the Ministry 
of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare is working on could expand its 
coverage to include the unemployed. To achieve these goals it implies that the 
Government has to establish a reserve fund to finance these proposals. An income 
redistributive mechanism should be implemented through pricing, incomes policy and 
subsidies. 
These, however, are only short-term recommendations which only superficially address 
themselves to the problem. While we recommend the adoption of the afore-mentioned 
recommendations, we strongly recommend that long-term mechanisms to the problem 
of price control and consumer protection be looked into. 
4 "Consumer price rise in Hungary", The Herald, December 29,1987, p.9. 
5 "Sweet deal for US sugar growers", Ibid., p.9. 
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Long-Term Solutions 
Price control as a means of insulating the economy from inflation can onlv be influential 
if it takes into account the root causes of price fluctuations. This entails the 
implementation of an economic reform programme and thus a re-organisation of the 
price formation system should take into account the following: 
• Stretching of prices as incentives in developing technological processes and raising 
the efficiency of social production. 
• Successive approximation of price levels to socially necessary labour costs. 
• Establishment of a much closer connection between the practice of price formation 
and the aims and tasks of macro-economic planning/' 
The degree of effectiveness of price control and consumer protection as a protective 
measure should be understood in their complementary level of relationship. The key 
monetary indicators of costs, profit and price are essential in order to capture the 
modalities which underpin the relations networks between price control and consumer 
protection. Planned cost calculations provide for the rational use of material, labour, 
financial resources with a view to achieving the target volumes of production and sales 
with the least cost or conversely ensuring the greatest volume of production and sales 
given the amount of resources allocated. 
The object of the analysis of price control in our perspective is therefore the cost of 
production. This constitutes a major and determinant factor in the fixation of prices or 
the determination of the maximum prices charged (controlled prices). In other words, 
the methods applied to calculate the production costs at all levels constitute the major 
criteria for assessing the effectiveness of price control and thus the degree to which 
consumers are protected. Based on this assumption the correlation between price 
control and consumer protection could be direct or indirect depending on the context 
in which it is analysed. 
Our departing point from the Government's price control mechanism in this analysis is 
that consumers should be protected not only by monitoring the violation of price control 
regulations, but that the consumer should be protected right from the enterprise. This 
entails Government monitoring or participation in the calculation of the cost of 
production from the initial stages of the production process to sector and national levels. 
This would mean that producer prices for raw materials and intermediate goods have 
to be controlled and determined by the State. 
The marginal productivity theory notes that an increase in productivity exerts a 
downward pressure on prices and an upward pressure on wages.1 The understanding of 
the mechanics should be based on the analysis of the existing level of costs and of those 
factors that exert a decisive influence on their formation in the base period and an 
assessment of possible reserves for making economies. A planned price formation 
system as a method of control is advocated for in this paper. The formation of the 
"planned price system" would be inter-related with the entire system of the economic 
levers used in the centralised management of the economy. 
6 Berri, L. Ya; Socialism Today: Planning A Socialist Economy, P. 214. 
7 Perlman, Richard: Wage Determination: Market or Power Forces? p.55, 
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The mechanics of effecting the system would necessitate an evaluation of the effect of 
the most crucial factors on the movement of costs in a defined/determined plan period. 
This should be considered together with a generalisation of information obtained 
regarding changes in the various standard costs and calculations of the long-term level 
costs. This would determine the future development trend of the costs of production 
and thus the prices. 
Our perspective highlighted in this paper is centred on the fact that price control as a 
means of insulating the economy from inflation can only be influential if it takes into 
account the root causes of price fluctuation, i.e. both on the international scene and the 
domestic economy. For price control to be effective it has to be effected from the initial 
stages of the production process. This would mean that producer prices for raw 
materials and other producer prices have to be controlled. 
It is on this basis that we strongly recommend that as a first step towards the 
implementation of this recommendation a commission or a study team be set up to 
closely examine producer prices in the private sector. 
This can only be done if the State sector is first developed through expansion or/and 
nationalisation of key sectors and the application of socialist principles of management 
to consolidate the public sector. The information obtained would then be used to 
determine the authenticity and reliability of producer prices presented to the 
Government by the private sector. The setting up of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Producer Prices would provide basic information into the determination of the most 
effective price control mechanism which would take into account the root causes of price 
fluctuation. 
Internal Price Formation System and the World Market Economy 
Price control cannot be dealt with in isolation from imported inflation. The question of 
how the economy can be insulated from imported inflation, especially where raw 
materials and intermediate goods are imported, is quite important. There is a link 
between foreign trade prices of goods and prices of goods manufactured from imported 
raw materials. The 1982 and 1987 price freezes have seen the problem of manufacturers 
increasing prices, justifying their increases on the increase of prices of imported raw 
materials, spare parts, machinery, etc. 
The exposition presented above dealt with the internanl price formation system and its 
organisation. The role and significance of the three financial categories of cost, price 
and profit were highlighted and a brief explanation of the functions of prices has been 
made. All this contributed to the conclusion that price formation for individual 
enterprises, sectors or regions is not representative of the national interest unless it is 
integrated into a system which takes into account the mutual interrelationships and 
encompasses the entire economy. 
The internal price structure has been deliberately isolated from the global context in 
which it operates only for the purpose of analysis. In this section the pricing system 
should be seen in an international perspective. The importance of this approach is that 
the "world market" pricing system has since (especially from the early 60s) had crippling 
effects on the national economy. This is also conditioned by the economy's dependence 
on this so-called world market. 
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Given the restructuring of the financial categories, the State is called upon to exercise 
a conscious and calculated monitoring of the interrelationships existing between these 
categories and the "world market" price formation system. To this end, a systematic and 
organic forecasting machinery should not only make abstractions on the most obvious 
connections. These can be defined in terms of the necessary equalities between exports 
from one country and imports from other countries, capital flows from other countries 
and capital inflows to one country, migration of labour, the relationships between 
exchange rates of other countries and the corresponding rates in one country, 
interrelationships between prices through the "world market", etc. 
As is expected, foreign trade prices are determined by a simultaneous interdependent 
set of relationships between ail trading countries, each country contributing its own 
elements of domestic inflation to world trade price trends but each country's domestic 
inflation also being influenced by international trends. The relative importance of 
domestic and international influences depend on the size and degree of openness of the 
domestic economy. In the case of Zimbabwe, international economic influences are 
considerably more powerful than domestic. 
These abstractions merely describe what exists and do not provide an articulated analysis 
of the likely impact of these connections on the working man in a factory, on the 
consumer of non-traded goods, i.e. on the internal pricing system. Without this analysis, 
which is only possible in the presence of an integrated internal pricing system, no 
solution to the internal problem is possible, whatever the extent of humanitarian 
tinkering. 
Making a point on the extent and complications involved into these connections 
Johansen puts it as follows: 
In plan elaboration in most countries very much of what happens in other countries, or on the 
"world market" is taken as exogenously determined. From an overall point of view this is, of course, 
not the best presentation of the actual mechanism. In the first place, some of the "exogenous" 
variables from the point of view of one country are endogenous from the overall point of view 
where the interactions are taken into account. This means that they are in principle also influenced 
by what happens in the first country itself. Secondly, some exogenous variables from a point of 
view of one country, are economic-political instruments. These are then more truly exogenous 
from the point of view of a country not in command of these instruments, but the most realistic 
representation would in many cases be to consider them as possible actions of other players in the 
game .S 
The relevance of the cited paragraph to the Zimbabwean economy which is linked to 
the "world market" by the dominating international finance capital is obvious. The 
predominance, by these transnational corporations, of the economy is a condition which 
forces our inorganic economies (and other Third World economies) to depend mostly 
on the exportation of primary goods/raw materials. The prices of the raw materials are 
obviously determined by the transnationals who by virtue of their economic power 
"control" and influence the behaviour of the market. 
This is not a one-way relationship. The Zimbabwean economy depends mostly on 
imported intermediate goods and technology. And the transnationals are undoubtedly 
the main actors in this second relationship as was the case in the first. They fix 
monopolistic prices which do not in any way match those for raw materials from the 
8 Johansen, Leif; Lectures on Macro-Economic Planning, Part I: General Aspects, p.217. 
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Third World countries. These links leave the internal structures and the functioning of 
the economy vulnerable to uncontrolled factors of the international economy. This 
would to a greater extent determine the resulting state of the local company. This 
vulnerability can principally be attributed to the low level of utilisation of local raw 
materials which further explains the degree to which the backward and forward linkages 
are developed in this country. 
But as Halimana (1987) observes, many of the problems in this regard can be attributed 
to the discretionary powers of the economic giants: 
The heavy preponderance of capital and intermediate goods in imports shows the limitations of the 
manufacturing sector as it is "structured" now. Some of these imports only need relatively simple 
processes, most of which are readily available in Zimbabwe.9 
This also defines the role of transnationals in transferring part of their inflation to our 
economy. While cheap labour is an attraction to transnationals it is also a condition for 
their continued exploitation of Third World countries' resources. Governments have 
been forced to subsidise corporations against the "rising labour costs". The "rising costs", 
in actual fact, are a result of the imported inflation which is then unconsciously 
transferred (by internal actors) to non-traded goods; most of which constitute the basic 
food basket of the workers. In the case of Zimbabwe where subsidies to the consumer 
are continuously being scrapped, the situation is a lot more dramatic. 
There are the transnationals which are subsidised from the inflation which they actually 
create at both the international and local level. They are the main actors in this game 
and the masses of the working people only constitute a marginal factor. 
On the exportation of inflation, Castro in The World Crisis wrote: 
In recent years it has been possible to note, first of all, Third World subordination to the general 
trends in the developed capitalist world, which passes on the effects of the crisis to the weakest 
countries.10 
He continues: 
This is particularly evident in the inflation rates which grew 15 percent more in the 
non-oil-exporting underdeveloped countries than in the market-economy developed countries in 
the 1974-75 period. Inflation imported by means of the international monetary and trade system 
has become an erosive factor in the deteriorated Third World economies which, except in the case 
of the oil-exporting countries, do not have any defence mechanism to counter even partially these 
negative trends. Similar conclusions may be drawn from the deterioration in the terms of trade, 
which dropped by 15 percent in the non-oil-exporting countries in the 1974-75 period.11 
The gap between the prices at which the transnationals appropriate our raw materials 
and the prices at which these transnationals sell their products to Third World countries 
(Zimbabwe included) clearly explain the relationship which exists between the North 
and the South. It also points to the need for a more co-ordinated assessment and 
calculation of the national levels of the cost of production and the subsidisation of 
production (when it is justified) and the consumers at all levels. 
9 Halimana, M.C., "Industrialisation in the Context of Liberalisation: Issues for Zimbabwe in the 
Coming Decade". 
10 Castro, F., The Third World Crisis: Its Economic and Social Impact in the Underdeveloped 
Countries, p.31. 
11 Castro, F., Ibid., p.31. 
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APPENDIX I 
PRICE CONTROL IN ZIMBABWE: A ZNCC PERSPECTIVE 
By K. Mandevhani 
A. WHAT IS PRICE CONTROL? 
• Generally: Government intervention to regulate price levels of selected 
produces and services as part of its macro-policy controls (fiscal and monetary). 
• In particular: There are three types of price control currently in use in Zimbabwe: 
- Control by specific price. 
- Control by specific mark-up. 
- Control by Ministerial approval. 
B. WHY PRICE CONTROL? (OBJECTIVES): 
- Complement other economic policies to achieve overall objectives e.g. 
employment creation, inflation control, economic growth, etc., 
- Inflation control 
- Redistribution of resources 
- Manage shortages. 
C HOW (MODUS OPERANDI): 
- Various Statutory Instruments - see p. 1315 
- Supervising Ministries 
- Trade and Commerce: Inspectorate Division, etc.; Prices Control Boards. 
D. ZNCC'S POSITION: 
The ZNCC is agreeable to Price Control inasfar as it is one of many policy 
controls. Government relies upon in achieving its intended economic 
objectives. There is, however, the need to ensure that no side-effects occur. If 
this is ignored, business viability suffers and thus consumers and workers, even 
Government, lose. 
E. SOME NEGATIVE ASPECTS: 
- Price control suppresses and does not control inflation, e.g. 
producers reducing quality of product to maintain margins. In fact, it can lead 
to inflation when demand outstrips supply on account of artificially low prices. 
- Reduces business profit margins thus inhibiting investment, employment 
creation, product extension and international competitiveness. 
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- Overall, can lead to lack of development, e.g. rural areas, rural 
traders, transport costs. 
- Burden to the fiscus, i.e. additional manpower, e.g. price control inspectors. 
- Bureaucratic delays, e.g. price increase applications take time before being 
approved. 
- May not achieve its intended objectives, more so when no supportive sound 
policies exist. 
- Leads to malpractices, e.g. hoarding in anticipation of price increase. 
- Quality reduction to maintain profit margins. 
F. ZNCC RECOMMENDATIONS: 
The existing Price Control system has failed. The two price freezes of 1981 and 1987 
are enough testimony. 
Short-Term: 
- Control intermediate goods/raw materials. 
- Government control should be in the form of fiscal monetary policy, e.g. 
taxing expenditure/income and subsidising the recipients. 
APPENDIX II 
Price Control in Zimbabwe: A ZCTU Perspective 
by J.S. Mutandare 
Labour produces wonders for the rich, but, deprivation of the workers, it produces palaces - but 
for the worker hovels; produces beauty, but for the worker deformity, produces intelligence - but 
for the worker, stupidity, cretinism. 
This observation puts succinctly the conditions facing workers within capitalist relations 
of production, whereby the worker is estranged from the produce of his labour. The 
product of labour is alienated from its producer and becomes so elusive to obtain under 
conditions of general degeneration of the value of labour power. This then is the 
premise for the ZCTU's position on price control and consumer protection. 
The current price control system in Zimbabwe is governed by one major piece of 
legislation, namely the Control of Goods Act (Price Control) Order No. SI 263 of 1982. 
In analysing the price control system currently in force in Zimbabwe, one must spell out 
what the legislation must aim at. 
Firstly, price control legislation (and system) must generally have, as its principal aim, 
the provision of commodities to all the people at affordable costs. It must remove the 
financial barriers that exist and that hinder the majority of our people, the lower income 
group in particular, from enjoying a higher living standard by virtue of lack of means. It 
must form an integral strategy of dismantling capitalist property relations and the hunger 
and poverty that go with them, and the building in their place of socialist ones. It must 
be part of the general strategy of redistributing wealth in a society. In the process, this 
aim will have to be looked at in light of the general production process in the country, 
which will have to be changed continuously to match new circumstances for the 
consumer. Production, therefore, will have to be equally aimed at the creation of wealth 
for the betterment of the general living standards of the people, rather than at making 
huge profits for some individual owners of the means of production. Secondly, it must 
devise a system or method of ensuring that the general aims and objectives of price 
control are realised. It will be a futile exercise if very noble and people-oriented aims 
have no well designed system to have them realised. Aims or intentions alone are quite 
inadequate. The legislation must ensure that whatever is aimed at is achieved through 
the rigorous and efficient implementation and monitoring of the price control 
mechanism. 
Government Policy and Price Control: A Review 
The promulgation of the new price control regulations by Government through 
Statutory Instrument 263 of 1982, Control of Goods (Price Control) Order and the 
establishment of the Prices Control Board bears testimony to the seriousness of 
Government in protecting the consumer. 
Government policy on price control is clearly defined in the functions of the Prices 
Board and Price Control Committee which includes:-
• Advising the Minister of Trade and Commerce on matters relating to the price 
control system; 
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© Checking on any profiteering elements in prices of exploitation of the public while 
at the same time ensuring that firms remain profitable and viable; and 
• Checking that essential basic commodities are available to the masses of the people 
at reasonable prices. 
• Striking a balance between the provision of basic commodities at affordable prices 
and maintaining profitability. 
The sudden withdrawal of the cushioning device (subsidies) has greatly skewed the 
balance against the lowly paid workers, the unemployed, peasants and other sectors of 
the lower strata of our society. 
Decomposition of the Value of Labour 
The colonial capitalist economy was based on the reproduction of ultra-cheap 
semi-proletarianised labour, conditions which the post-independence Government 
sought to resolve, particularly through a policy of centrally determined annual wage 
reviews. Despite its noble intentions, Government's objectives of recomposing the 
value of labour have been overwhelmed by the inflationary pressures that ensued. 
The high levels of inflation for foodstuffs between 1983 and 1986, and the June 1986 
period, reflect the negative impact of the reduction of consumer subsidies on prices. 
The rate of inflation for foodstuffs, at 20,9% and 19,7% for June and July 1987 
respectively, was somewhat overwhelming when one considers that foodstuffs account 
for at least 55% of their income. 
Inflation and Wages 
Whatever workers gained in wage increases has been lost through inflation. The table 
shows the impact of inflation on wages between 1980 and July 1987 for workers in 
commerce and industry. 
Table 1 
MINIMUM WAGE DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY BETWEEN 1980 AND 
JULY 1987: (1980= 100) 
Year CPI NW($) NWI RW($) RWI PP 
1980 100,0 70 100,0 70,00 100,0 0,0 
1981 113,1 85 121,4 175,20 107,4 + 7,4 
1982 125,2 105 150,0 83,90 119,8 + 19,8 
1983 154,1 115 164,3 74,60 106,6 +6,6 
1984 185,2 125 178,6 67,50 96,4 -3,6 
1985 200,9 143 204,3 71,20 101,7 + 1,7 
1986 229,7 158 225,7 65,50 98,3 -1,7 
1987 264,8 158 225,7 59,67 85,2 -14,8 
Where: 
CPI = Consumer Price Index 
NW=Nominal Wage 
NWI=Nominal Wage Index 
RW=Real Wage 
RWI=Real Wage Index 
PP=Purchasing Power 
From the table above, it can be seen that real wages increased from 1980 and reached 
an all-time peak in 1982, and thereafter declined (except for 1985 when there was a slight 
upturn). Workers are experiencing the worst wage levels in real terms since 
independence. If workers in commerce and industry were to get their 1982 minimum 
wage $, they should be earning $220,08, but the present minimum is $158,13. The 
Poverty Datum Line for a family of six is approximately $319,52 at July 1987 prices. A 
study by the PE Consulting Group noted that workers have experienced the worst gap 
between their salaries and the consumer price index in three years (Financial Gazette, 
Friday, January 30,1987, page 3). 
Inflation and Purchasing Power 
The purchasing power of the 1980 dollar has been eroded by approximately 62% 
between 1980 and July 1987 and is worth 30 cents (at July 1987 prices). 
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Table 2 
REAL VALUE OF THE 1980 DOLLAR FOR THE HIGHER AND LOWER-INCOME URBAN 
FAMILIIES. 
YEAR HIGHER-INCOME GROUP LOWER-INCOME GROUP 
CPI Real Value 
of 1980$ 
CPI Real Value 
of 1980$ 
1980 100,0 100,0 cents 100,0 100,0 cents, 
1981 114,6 87,3 cents 113,1 88,4 cents , 
1982 135,1 74,0 cents 125,2 79,9 cents 
1983 158,0 63,3 cents 154,1 64,9 cents 
1984 177,7 56,6 cents 185,2 54,0 cents 
1985 195,3 51,2 rents 200,9 49,8 cents 
1986 222,8 44,9 cents 229,7 43,5 cents 
1987 252,2 39,7 cents 264,8 37,8 cents 
Up and until 1983, the rate of devaluation of the dollar for the highly paid was higher 
than that for the lowly paid, but thereafter the trend is reversed. It is the lowly paid who 
are increasingly being marginalised at a relatively higher rate and this has distributed 
income away from these households, negating the Government's policy of Growth with 
Equity. In its survey, the PE Consulting Group noted that the ratio of fringe benefits to 
total cash salary has risen, which shows that those in well-paid jobs have found a 
cushioning device for inflation, while the lowly paid remain very vulnerable. It is the 
lowly paid who suffer more from inflation and their jobs have become even more 
insecure as the incidence of retrenchments increases. 
The foregoing arguments have shown the incessant decomposition of the value of 
labour, against a general background of increased price levels and removal of consumer 
subsidies. In this vein, the Riddell Commission (1981) stated in its report: 
The Commission believes that the most effective, permanent and least costly method of protecting 
consumers from rising food prices is to ensure that their incomes are sufficiently high to allow 
these prices to be paid. 
On the contrary, prices have shot up, while real wages have plummeted to their lowest 
level since independence. The pressure is now on the restoration of the value of labour, 
as it has been persistently estranged from its products. It was observed at the recent 
Zimbabwe Occupational Safety Council Shaw that most miners go to work without 
taking any food because they no longer have the means to do so. The degeneration of 
the worker has gone on unbelted as inflation mounts, subsidies are removed, 
unemployment is rife and the marginalisation of the lower strata of our society sharpens. 
It is against this background that the ZCTU calls for a more effective implementation 
of price controls, and a general widening of the controls to include all items in the 
Poverty Datum Line (PDL) diet. 
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Recommendations 
• The establishment of an incomes policy for Zimbabwe through the Prices and 
Incomes Commission so as to reconstitute the worker onto the economic map and 
recompose the value of labour power. 
• Increased monitoring of price control through a co-ordinated approach involving 
- the establishment and institution of a worker inspectorate: 
- the policy for price control programme 
- the Consumer Council, Government and other bodies involved in price control 
and consumer protection. 
Emphasis should move away from the present centralised structure to a 
decentralised one which enables full participation of everyone down to the 
grassroots. 
• Consumer awareness education for all. An informed consumer can easily expose 
unscrupulous businessmen. In this vein the mass media can play an important role. 
For example, a monthly price list for all controlled commodities should be published 
in the newspapers and the establishment of a magazine exclusively on consumerism 
wherein the ZCTU, Government, Consumer Council and research institutions can 
publish their research findings on consumer-related issues. 
• Establishment of consumer co-operatives that can provide necessities at reasonable 
prices. 
• Establishment of a blacklist of all companies that violate Price Control Regulations 
and its monthly publication through the mass media. This will discourage 
unscrupulous businessmen from overcharging. 
• Establishment of area-specific consumer action groups. This will give power to the 
consumer and easily overcome exploitation as at present especially through 
conditional buying in times of shortages. 
• Establishment of decentralised wholesale centres, especially at growth points. This 
will remove the incidence of transport margins that have often been cited as 
justifications for price hikes especially in rural areas. 
With the active participation of all the organisations involved in consumer protection in 
various ways, we can invariably close the present gaps in price control and help 
recompose the value of labour power. 
APPENDIX III 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE ZCTU/CONSUMER COUNCIL OF 
ZIMBABWE JOINT WORKSHOP ON PRICE CONTROL AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION 
Preamble 
The workshop on Price Control and Consumer Protection, which was jointly organised 
by ZCTU and the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe, made the following 
recommendations on the understanding that: 
• Price control and consumer protection under capitalism is conceived narrowly and 
implemented half-heartedly in the interest of capitalist profit. 
• The present narrowly conceived and poorly implemented price control and 
consumer protection measures must be reviewed and strengthened in the period of 
transition from capitalism to socialism in Zimbabwe. 
• Effective price control and consumer protection, which must be interpreted to mean 
a steady increase in the standard of living of working people, can only be fully 
realised after the victory of socialism over capitalism. 
The workshop strongly recommended that Government should reject the 
recommendations by the Commission of Inquiry into Taxation that price control should 
be relaxed and finally abolished. In fact, price control should be strengthened and 
widened. The workshop went to make the following other resolutions: 
Recommendations on Price Control 
• Ministry of Trade and Commerce branch of Price Control Inspectorate needs to be 
decentralised (which apparently is the process right now). 
• There is need for stronger ties and coordinated cooperation between the Ministry 
of Trade and Commerce Inspectorate, Consumer Council operatives and the police, 
ZIDS, the labour movement, etc. 
• Blacklisting of price abusive tradesmen should be introduced in the form of: 
- A stern warning for first offenders together with punitive measures based 
on various guidelines; and 
- Finally, blacklisting with such blacklisting being subject to review, say, after a 
period of two years. 
• Overcharging is theft and should therefore be treated as a criminal offence. 
Businessmen who are found to be overcharging also happen in some cases to be 
influential political figures, councillors, etc; who are not only violating price control 
but also stealing from the masses for whom they are supposed to stand guardian and 
custodian. To this end, therefore, we recommend that for first offenders, minimum 
fines be raised from $25 to $200 with second offenders doubling on the fines to $400 
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and third offenders appearing in court. If all these deterrent measures, i.e. 
blacklisting and fining, fail as well as court prosecution, then the licence should be 
withdrawn. 
• For greater impact of the last two penalties suggested above we recommend that 
information on fines, blacklisting and court appearances be made available either 
freely or in confidence (if there are any legal complications) to bodies that can 
publicly conscientise the consumers, e.g. Women's Affairs, mass media (probably 
news department), Consumer Council reports/magazine, Youth Brigades, the 
police, etc. Price lists of basic commodities and their maximum mark-ups should 
also be made available to these bodies. 
• Whereas prices of commodities sold on auction cannot be controlled, we 
recommend that prices of commodities bought at auctions should be controlled like 
their counterparts on resale. We also recommend that those basic commodities in 
short supply be not sold at auctions unless there are legal implications. 
• Whereas this may be a complicated and long-term process, we recommend that the 
establishment of cooperative or people's stores and wholesalers be considered as a 
control device on unscrupulous traders since the competitive prices they will set will 
have a direct impact. 
• We also recommend that the legislation on the display of prices on commodities be 
amended to reflect synonymity with the commodity, i.e. the price of a commodity 
must be displayed so that it is immediately seen without moving or shifting or 
tampering with the commodity. 
• We recommend the formation of a task force to monitor the effectiveness of the 
current price freeze on all goods and services and the adherence of service 
organisations to existing regulations. To this end, we also recommend that the 
findings of the task force be publicised as and when they are available. 
• We recommend that the ministries that are charged with the responsibilities of the 
control of residential rents be requested to come up with an effective and usable 
mechanism that ensures the protection of the tenants and, in particular, the lodgers. 
The task force must also establish what lodgers are paying for rent in view of the 
current price freeze. 
• Flouters of Price Control Regulations, such as those practising conditional selling, 
hoarding, etc, should be blacklisted. 
Recommendations on Consumer Protection 
There is need for public awareness campaigns on consumer rights. Such action should 
start at grassroots level using existing structures in both the urban and communal areas. 
• Prices of controlled goods should be clearly displayed in the shops. 
• All purchases from retailers should be acknowledged by receipt. 
• The concept of consumerism should be incorporated into the police force 
curriculum. 
• The Ministry of Health should lay down the maximum permitted levels of chemicals 
in cosmetics which may be dangerous to consumers. 
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• The practice of selling scarce commodities to regular customers only must be legally 
penalised and if there are legislative provisions that allow it, those provisions must 
be repealed. 
a A small claims court must be established. 
© The Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs should consider drafting 
legislation which would make it a criminal offence to sell a product which is not of 
merchantable quality. 
• Contracts in common use should be vetted by the Government legal department 
and translated into the major indigenous languages at the expense of the sellers of 
goods or services that require the use of such contracts. 
• Consumer protection must be seen first and foremost as meaning ensuring an 
increase in the standard of living of working people. Thus: 
- Prices must related to wages; and 
- The range of items regarded as essential commodities must be widened. 
35 
